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could, if it wished, either add to or subtract from the national grades for the
purpose of determining admissibility in a local jurisdiction.7
To this major recommendation for the establishment of a national bar
examination, this reviewer respectfully takes exception. The analogy made
in this matter to the medical and accountancy professions seems far-fetched.
Law, we know, has its variants not only in the area of statutory law, but also
in the wider field of the common law. If the purpose of bar examinations
is to select and license those deemed competent to advise clients as to their
rights and obligations in a specific jurisdiction, it would seem that the examinations should, in a large measure, be shaped with a view of the governing
law of that jurisdiction. Optional supplementation of a nationally administered bar examination with a sprinkling of some aspects of local law seems,
to this reviewer, inadequate.
A nationally administered bar examination may achieve economy and efficiency, but these are not the sum total of the desiderata for determining
capacity to practice law.
LOUIS PRASHKER.*

EVIDENcE. By John Evarts Tracy.
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1952. Pp. v, 382. $5.35.

HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF

New York:

A critique is essentially an evaluation of an effort in terms of its objectives. The objectives of this Handbook are, according to its preface, to serve
as a text or as collateral reading for law students; to fill "the needs of the
young attorney who must have in his library some book on evidence but who
cannot yet afford to purchase one of the exhaustive works; . . . to serve the
interests of the busy trial attorney, as a refresher before going into court,
or for quick investigation of a problem arising in the middle of a trial";
indeed, as the author declares: "In writing this book I have endeavored to
place myself in the position of the reader, whoever he may be."'
This, of course, is no slight undertaking and it is, perhaps, unremarkable
that it does not quite succeed. The needs and capacities of the undergraduate
law student on the one hand, and the requirements of "the busy trial attorney"
on the other, are so divergent as not likely to be served effectively by the same
effort. A pedagogical text is a device for developing intellectual powers. Its
materials are arranged to accommodate the student's developing comprehension
and skill. It should be discursive, repetitive, argumentative and provocative.2
A professional manual is primarily a source of information, organized to provide easy access to the information sought. It should be comprehensive, com7 P. 459.

* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.
'TRAcy, HANDBOK OF THE LAW OF EvmDEwc p. v (1952).
2A

model, by which all writers of law student texts might well be guided,
(1947).

is MAGUmE, EvIDENCE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW
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pendious, expository, and authoritative. The techniques, traditions and policies
of Anglo-American jurisprudence are the law student's concern. The practicing lawyer engaged in a "quick investigation of a problem arising in the
middle of a trial" seeks precise information concerning the pertinent legislative
3
authority and judicial precedents of a particular jurisdiction.
In the arrangement of topics this Handbook reflects the author's endeavor
to be guided by the needs of the reader "whoever he may be." At the outset
the introductory chapter, containing one and a half pages devoted to the History of the Anglo-American Law of Evidence, a brief classification of evidence
and a briefer definition of terms, was apparently intended for the novitiate.
The very next chapter (Chapter I) entitled "How to Use Judicial Admissions
in Trials" is manifestly addressed to the professional reader, its utility to the
student of evidence at the threshold of his study being doubtful.
A similar ambivalence characterizes the author's style and choice of content. His tone is personal, the approach informal; a new topic is often introduced by a question and answer with an illustrative problem; continuity being
emphasized by references to what has preceded and what is to follow; all
appropriate to a teaching medium. Thus the subject of presumptions begins:
"As we have seen before, the question of the burden of proof is often affected
by what the law calls 'presumptions.' What is a presumption? It is more
than an ordinary inference, it is an inference to which the law applies certain
legal consequences." 4 Then follows an exemplifying problem. Throughout
this pedagogical development of topics there are frequent references to trial
tactics, procedural devices and helpful hints of the "How to

______"

variety.

Some of these practical tips may appear to the law student to be out of
context and therefore not very helpful. For example, on the subject of authenticating documents for introduction into evidence, the author, having explained
that a reply written to an earlier letter may therefore be self-authenticating,
cautions the trial lawyer, that since the original of the first letter is probably
in the hands of the opponent a notice to produce must be served upon him to
render secondary evidence of its contents admissible under the best evidence
rule.5 The reader who is unacquainted with a notice to produce and who has
yet to study the best evidence rule is instructed by a footnote to "see page 80."
Many of these practical suggestions are quite sensible and may indeed
prove useful in the middle of a trial to the lawyer who faces a problem for
which Professor Tracy offers a solution. To cite an instance, the many phases
of the problem of laying a foundation for secondary evidence are well illustrated including the one "where the attorney for the proponent has failed to
serve a notice to produce, owing to poor preparation of his case . . . Is the
situation hopeless? No; . . . the proponent can call to the stand both the
opponent and his attorney and ask each whether he has the document in court."

3 A typical and popular exposition of local law (New York) is RIcHARn-

SOx, THE LAW OF EvENCF (7th ed. 1948).
4 TRAcY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 29.

5 Id. at 68.
6 Id. at 83.
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Other trial tips are less enlightening, as for example: "The ordinary child
is a great weaver of romances. He may often relate something he has read
in a story as a personal experience. His story should be searched for its truth
before he is called to the stand. If he is a witness for the opponent, he should
be skillfully cross-examined." 7 Child and adult witnesses do not differ greatly
in this respect leaving only the problems: How to check the witness' story
for accuracy and how to cross-examine skillfully.
Confining a "treatise" on the law of evidence to one small volume compels
an economy of expression. Brevity of exposition is likely to result in mere
dogmatic recitals of precepts. Thus vicarious admissions by privies in title
are treated in this summary fashion: "The admissions of a grantor of property are admissible against a grantee claiming under him. The only limitation
on the application of this rule is the logical one that the admission must have
been made during the grantor's ownership of the property." 8 The complexities
in the application of this rule to issues involving title to real property caused
by the parol evidence rule and title recording acts are ignored, and no mention
is made of the New York rule by which such admissions are limited to cases
involving real property.9
In the endeavor to cover the subject the author sometimes resorts to a
mere categorical listing of numbered propositions with examples. Thus in
treating the rule that in a criminal prosecution evidence of other crimes committed by the accused is not admissible to prove his criminal disposition but
may be offered for any other relevant purpose, the author lists and illustrates,
as if they were exclusive, the more common relevant purposes of motive, intent, mistake (absence of), identity and common scheme or plan.10 Of the
last he says only: "An act that is a crime may appear in some ways to be
entirely innocent-for example, a confidence game. To show that it is not
innocent, but a concerted scheme or plan to commit a criminal act, evidence
may be offered of other crimes of the same sort committed by the accused, or
more than one distinct crime, all parts of the same scheme." 11 In the example
given the only relevant purpose is to show the accused's criminal intent or
absence of mistake and is appropriate only to those other categories. Evidence
of other crimes committed by an accused evincing a common design is relevant
7 Id. at 126. On the other hand in the very next paragraph there appears
this sage advice: "Caution should also be used in preparing the child witness
for his examination. An experienced attorney will not ordinarily call a witness to the stand unless he has first thoroughly gone over with him the story
he is to tell the court and jury and has prepared him for cross-examination to
which he may be subjected. But it is not safe to do this too thoroughly with
a child witness, for if he is asked on cross-examination 'Why did you say
so-and-so?,'
he is likely to reply 'Because Mr. Blank told me to.',
8
Id. at 240.
9 Paige v. Cagwin, 7 Hill 361 (N. Y. 1843).
10 Law students commonly identify this subject as the "MIMIC" rule, the
term being derived from the initial letters of the words describing these five
instances. In fact Professor Tracy lists a sixth: means of accomplishment
of the crime charged. In any case, students tend to memorize these categories
without comprehension.
11 TRAcy, op. cit. supra note 1, at 333.
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to prove that the criminal act for which he is on trial, being the product of
such design, was in fact committed 2by him, and not merely to evidence the
intent with which it was committed.'
Conciseness in exposition may account for many statements that are misleading' 3 or border on the erroneous.' 4 But constrictions of space do not
explain outright errors of concept, expression 25 and typography.' 6 Twentyfour pages are devoted to the parol evidence rule, yet the author is content to
treat the proceeding for reformation of a written transaction on the ground
of mistake as an "exception" to the parol evidence rule, saying: "These are
fundamental powers of a Court of Equity, and powers that could not be
exercised without a violation of the parol evidence rule, for in nearly every case
the evidence on which the relief is granted is the oral testimony of witnnesses
(sic) to the facts on which the decree is based." 17 Since Professor Tracy concedes that the rule of integration is one of substantive law it would have been
consistent and correct to acknowledge that parol evidence admitted to avoid a

12 An apt illustration is People v. Duffy, 212 N. Y. 57, 105 N. E. 839 (1914),
where evidence, that the accused, a police sergeant, had "shaken down" other
gambling house proprietors named on a list the defendant had obtained from
his predecessor, was admissible to prove his extortion upon complainant, whose
name was included on the list.
"As each member of a con13 E.g., TRAcY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 239:
spiracy is liable for the acts of every other conspirator, the admission of a
coconspirator may be received to affect the proof against the others. The
same logic makes admissible the admission of one joint tort-feasor against
another." Of course the admissions of one joint tort-feasor are admissible
against another only as he was authorized to make such admission for the
other. So only the admissions by a conspirator made in furtherance of the
conspiracy are admissible against his co-conspirators.
14 E.g., id. at 35. "A man disappears. After waiting a reasonable number
of years, less than seven, his wife remarries. Later the missing husband turns
up. Is the wife guilty of bigamy? At common law, where there is only a
seven years rule, she is; . . . " But cf. Regina v. Tolson, 23 Q. B. D. 168
(1889).
15 E.g., in discussing the problem of determining, in a telegraphed communication, which is the original document under the best evidence rule, the author
says: "In the sending of this message was the telegraph company the agent
of the sender or of the addressee? If of the addressee, the original will be
the message filed at the sending office; if of the sender, the original will be
the message delivered to the addressee." But in the next paragraph he states:
"If it has been determined, by applying the principles of substantive law, that
the telegraph company was the agent of the sender the original telegram will
be the one delivered to the telegraph company by the sender." Id. at 76 (emphasis added).
16 Typographical errors, as everyone knows, are caused by gremlins, over
which the writer exercises little control; but errors abounding in the citations
lead to the suspicion that they were found in the original manuscript. A spot
check of some dozen case citations disclosed errors in the page numbers of
two: footnote 49, page 53 and footnote 92, page 150; and misspelled case titles
in three: footnote 16, page 26; footnote 35, page 106; footnote 61, page 241.
Though a reviewer is not a proof reader, other typographical errors were noted
on pages
5, 70, 78. 97, 257 and 320.
'7 TRAcy, op. cit. supra note 1, at 97.
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voidable writing is not an exception to the rule and is admitted in any appropriate proceeding.1s
A more serious misconception is the view that the admissibility of parol
evidence to vary or contradict the terms of a written receipt is a "relaxation
of the parol evidence rule .. .adopted by the courts, again in their exercise
of good sense." 19 Since the rule applies only to valid written transactions
which effect intended changes in jural relations and since a mere receipt is not
such a transaction the admission of evidence to contradict the terms of a written receipt is not a "relaxation of the parol evidence rule."
In an otherwise instructive chapter on "Use of Evidence Illegally Obtained" Professor Tracy's adoption of Dean Wigmore's classification of limitations upon the federal rule excluding evidence seized in violation of the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution leads to the statement:
"Again until 1948 it was very generally held that a warrantless search and
seizure of contraband is not within the rule [of exclusion]." 20 The authority
cited for this proposition is Carroll v. United States21 wherein the Supreme
Court held that a search of a motor vehicle for illegally possessed liquor, upon
probable cause but without a warrant, was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment. This case is of course not authority for the proposition stated, nor,
22
apparently, is there any authority for this view. Dean Wigmore cited none.
On the contrary, there have been numerous reversals of convictions obtained
by evidence of illegally seized contraband. 23 Professor Tracy adds that in
1948 the Trupiano case overruled the Carroll case and "that line of decisions."
This likewise is incorrect. In the Trupiano case 24 the Supreme Court merely
ruled that a search without a warrant though incidental to a lawful arrest was
illegal where a search warrant could have been obtained. Finally the decision
in United States v. Jeffers 25 renders erroneous the statement: "A warrantless
search and seizure upon premises not owned or possessed by the party-defendant
is not within the rule." 26 (italics in original).
18 32 C. J. S. 938, which Professor Tracy cites as his authority, in fact
states: "Parol evidence is, as a general rule, admissible for the purpose of
showing that by reason of a mistake a written instrument does not truly express the intention of the parties, mistake being always recognized as one of
the grounds of equity jurisdiction; and, while many authorities declare that
evidence of mistake is admissible only in equity and not in a court of law, this
rule is by no means universal, and there are many cases in the books, especially since the tendency has grown up to obliterate the sharp distinctions between law and equity, in which parol evidence has been held admissible to
show a mistake in reducing the agreement to writing irrespective of the form
of the action and whether it is in fact an action at law or a suit in equity.
Where due to an overestimation of the quantity of goods purchased, the buyer
paid more than the amount due, in an action to recover the overpayment, the
parol evidence rule does not apply. .."
19 TRAcY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 101.
20Id. at 348.
21267 U. S. 132 (1924).
22 8 WIGmoRE, Evmaxc
§ 2184(a) (3d ed. 1940).
23 E.g., Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S.20 (1925).
24 Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S.699 (1948).
25 342 U. S. 48 (1951).
26 TRAcY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 348.
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Incidentally, in this same chapter, three and one-half pages are devoted
to the subject of wiretapping and judicial interpretations of the Federal Communications Act 27 without a mention of state statutes2 authorizing wiretapping or the conflict in state and federal decisions resulting.29
Careless diction probably accounts for the declaration that a witness may
testify "that a person's character is good or bad" 8 for in the same chapter
in arguing that opinion evidence of character should be admitted, Professor
Tracy acknowledges "but few courts are willing to do so." 32
The author's personal opinions are expressed vigorously and often. If
his criticisms of prevailing authority are of little use to the practitioner searching for judicial precedents they should have pedagogical value to the student.
His favorite target is any rule which permits parol testimony in contradiction
of the terms of a writing. Thus the rule that parol evidence is admissible to
prove that a writing purporting to be a contract was intended to be a sham
only, the author calls "socially unjustifiable, in that it encourages men to make
sham contracts to deceive third parties or to assert (an?) incredible defense
to actions on written contracts otherwise indefensible."; and he asks "Why
cannot the courts simply say, 'We will shut our ears to any story that asserts,
as a defense to a written contract, a claim that it was entered into only to
deceive someone, whether the person deceived be a party to the cause or not' ?"32
To this question there are, of course, several answers; first, that the victim
usually has a cause of action in deceit for any harm he may have sustained;
second, since both parties to the sham contract are equally guilty the law
should not aid either party; 33 third, that it will not discourage a party from
entering into a sham contract to enforce it at his instance; and fourth, whether
the defense that the contract is a sham is incredible only the triers of the fact
can determine after considering the evidence.
In the same vein Professor Tracy criticizes the rule that a merger clause
in a written contract, stipulating that no representations have been made other
than those appearing in the instrument, shall not bar parol evidence of fraud
in the inducement or execution of the writing. He complains: "The rule announced by the Court permits a party who has no apparent defense to an
obligation to devise a defense by making up a story in the hope that it will
be believed by the trier of fact . . . Such a rule encourages perjury and is
not wholesome." 34 (italics in original). He ignores the other side of the
U. S. C. §605.
E.g., N. Y. CONST. Art. I, § 12; N. Y. CoDa CRim. PRoc. §813(a).
29 See, e.g., Matter of Harlem Check Cashing Corp. v. Bell, 296 N. Y. 15,
68 N. E. 2d 854 (1946).
30 TRAcy, op. cit. sipra note 1, at 202.
32 Id. at 205.
332 Id. at 109.
3 However, to protect bank depositors, the court in Mount Vernon Trust
Co. v. Bergoff, 272 N. Y. 192, 5 N. E. 2d 196 (1936) held: "Public policy
requires that a person who, for the accommodation of the bank executes an
instrument which is in form a binding obligation, should be estopped from
thereafter asserting that simultaneously the parties agreed that the instrument
should not be enforced." Id. at 196, 5 N. E. 2d at 197.
34 TRAcy, op. cit. supra note 1,at 100.
27 47
28
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argument stated by the New York Court of Appeals: "A rogue cannot protect himself from liability for his fraud by inserting a printed clause in his
contract." 35
Not content with criticizing general doctrine the author troubles to take
issue, at length, with particular judicial opinions, apparently selected for that
purpose, and often to good effect; but in several instances only to expose his
own misconstruction of the facts or misconception of the law. In the chapter
entitled "Witnesses," 36 on the subject of the admissibility in evidence of a
witness' record of a past recollection, he illustrates the problem of the memorandum whose truth depends on the testimony of more than one witness by
a case 3 in which the plaintiff was permitted to prove the number of logs
delivered to the defendant by the tally kept by one of plaintiff's employees of
the count called to him by a co-worker, both in the regular course of plaintiff's
business. No mention is made of the fact that the admissibility of the memorandum is an exception to the hearsay rule as an entry made in the regular
course of a business. Indeed the hearsay rule and its exceptions are not treated
until two chapters later.3 8 Then citing the case of Peck v. Valentine,3 9 where
the count by one witness and the memorandum by another were not made in
the regular course of business wherefore the memorandum was held to be inadmissible hearsay, the author declares: "It is strange that some courts have
been so confused ....
Such a decision was altogether erroneous if one thinks
the problem through." 40 In the footnote he adds, "Fortunately this decision
was almost completely overruled in a later case, Mayer v. Second Ave. R. Co.,
102 N. Y. 572, 7 N. E. 905. The court makes a weak attempt at reconciling
the decisions." In fact the Mayer case, involving two memoranda, one which
was, and one which was not, admissible as an entry made in the regular course
41
of a business, is in complete harmony with Peck decision.

35 Ernst Iron Works vz Duralith Corp., 270 N. Y. 165, 169, 200 N. E. 683,

684 (1936).
36
37
38
39

Chapter 7.
Harwood v. Mulry, 8 Gray 250 (Mass. 1857).
Chapter 9.
94 N. Y. 569 (1884).
40 TRAcy, op. cit. supra.note 1, at 183.
41 It is passing strange that Professor Tracy, who is a member of the New
York Bar and who has engaged in active practice in that state for many years,
should misstate the local decisional and enacted law in several instances. Thus
on page 351, footnote 21, he states: "In New York the unreasonable search
and seizure prohibition is by statute rather than in the Constitution." In fact,
the statutory immunity from unlawful search and seizure was incorporated
in the New York Constitution (Article I, section 12) in 1938.
On page 181, footnote 151, after referring to the requirement that a
witness' recollection be exhausted before his past recorded recollection may be
admitted, the author says, "This rule, originally known as the 'New York'
rule, is no longer the rule in New York. People v. Weinberger, 239 N. Y.
307, 146 N. E. 434." In that case the court reversed a conviction for presenting an obscene play because the trial court had excluded, on an erroneous
ground, a script which had been compared with the play by the witness, whose
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Ironically, in the chapter on "Hearsay," on the subject of "Spontaneous
Exclamations," he does cite a case wherein the notation by a police officer of
the license number of an automobile, reported to him by a spectator several
minutes after an accident, was admitted, though the entry was not made in
the regular course of a business. 42 What that case does not illustrate is a
"spontaneous exclamation" admissible under that exception of the hearsay rule.
In explaining the admissibility of utterances forming the verbal part of an
act under the hearsay rule, the author digests three cases solely for the purpose of demonstrating their fallacious application of the verbal act doctrine.43
Cases properly applying the doctrine are merely cited in the footnotes. One
of the cases 44 criticized by the author is, in fact, an excellent exemplification
of the rule that evidence of the words accompanying an act otherwise relevant,
which give the act its legal significance, is admissible. In the action between
a landlord and his tenant's mortgagee on the issue whether certain corn seized
by the latter was the property of the former, after uncontroverted evidence
that the tenant had cQntracted to pay two-fifths of his corn crop as rent, the
court allowed testimony that when the tenant was about through husking the
corn he pointed to a crib of the corn in question and said to the landlord,
"Mr. Hanson, Here is your corn for this year. . . . This belongs to you Mr.
Hanson." The relevant acts were of course the delivery of the property to
the landlord by setting it apart, by identifying it as the landlord's property and
the landlord's acceptance and receipt by acquiescence. Without the tenant's
words, or other such manifestation of intent, title to the corn would not pass.
Emphasizing his misconception of a "verbal act" Professor Tracy argues that
the testimony should have been admitted as a vicarious admission by a predecessor of the mortgagee in title without recognizing that in the case of an
admission the truth of the statement is in issue and a jury may find the fact
untrue though it find that the statement was made.
These critical analyses of individual cases would have been more appropriate in a casebook or a law teacher's class notes. But perhaps this Handbook

recollection of the actual performance had not been expressly exhausted, the
court saying: "Under such circumstances the exclusion constitutes error even
if the evidence was not at the time competent, since it could be made so."
The court then added: "A rule of evidence should not be permitted to become a mere fetish; the evidence offered would unquestionably be competent
if a few preliminary questions had been asked of the witness as to his present
recollection; the asking of these questions would have been useless and could
have elicited no answers that would have helped the jury. The transcript represents a record of the witness' past memory of the play more reliable as
evidence than testimony based upon his present memory could possibly be ...
especially since no suggestion was made that the usual formal questions should
first be asked." Id. at 313, 146 N. E. at 435. It is submitted that in New
York a witness' present recollection must still prove to be inadequate to qualify
his recorded past recollection in evidence.
42 Chalmers v. Anthony, 8 N. J. Misc., 151 At. 549 (1930).
Cf. Johnson
v. Lutz, 253 N. Y. 124, 170 N. E. 517 (1930).
48
TIAcy, op. cit. supra note 1, at 183.
44 Hanson v. Johnson, 161 Minn. 229, 201 N. W. 322 (1924).
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is Professor Tracy's old lecture notes, revised and edited for current publication. Regardless, the stated purpose which the work most successfully fulfills
is to supply "the needs of the young attorney who must have in his library
some book on evidence but who cannot yet afford to purchase one of the
exhaustive works."
G. RoinET ELLEGAAIR.*

* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.

